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INTRODUCTION
A. The Professional License as a Property Right
The English language defines a license as: “permission to act.”1 By its legal
definition, a license is “[t]he certificate or document evidencing such permission.”2
The grant of a license is considered to be a vested property interest of the individual,
which is protected by due process:
The kind of property interests that due process encompasses
extends beyond the actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or
money to include legitimate claims of entitlement to governmental benefits. . . . “Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional
common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that
‘[s]ociety today is built around entitlement. The automobile
dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional
licenses, the worker his union membership, contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are
devices to aid security and independence.’”3
Because licenses are property rights,4 the U.S. Supreme Court has thus recognized
that due process protection applies to license revocation actions by the state.5
1

License Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/license (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
2
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (9th ed. 2009); see also 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 1
(2012) (“[F]ormal or official permit or permission to carry on some business or do some act
which, without the license, would be unlawful . . . .”).
3
J. Bruce Bennett, The Rights of Licensed Professionals to Notice and Hearing in
Agency Enforcement Actions, 7 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 205, 208 (2006) (quoting Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970)) (footnote omitted); see also Mark R. Fondacaro &
Dennis P. Stolle, Revoking Motor Vehicle and Professional Licenses for Purposes of Child
Support Enforcement: Constitutional Challenges and Policy Implications, 5 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 355, 363 (1996) (“The United States Supreme Court has clearly recognized
the issuance of both professional and motor vehicle licenses as creating important property
or liberty interests requiring due process protection.” (citations omitted)).
4
For the purposes of reviewing whether a license revocation law violates the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a
distinction between a license granting a right versus a privilege. See Bennett, supra note 3,
at 209; cf. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439 (1968) (arguing that “the concept of
‘privilege’ is today no longer viable, and that the size and power of the governmental role
in the public sector requires substantive due process control of the state in all its capacities”).
5
See Bennett, supra note 3, at 211 (“A state . . . cannot deprive a person of an issued
and outstanding license to practice a profession, or banish or exclude a person from the
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In the American federalist system the authority to issue most licenses lies at the
state level,6 within the purview of each state’s police power.7 The U.S. Supreme
Court has outlined the parameters of the state’s police power regarding licensing
broadly: “States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their
boundaries, and . . . as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and
other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.”8 This broadness is cited frequently
in court decisions that affirm the validity of state regulation of licensees’ operations.9
B. The Expanding Power of the State to Revoke Professional Licenses
What is increasingly common in state regulation of professional licenses is the
state actions revoking those licenses as a method of keeping the citizenry in check.10
practice of a profession, in a manner that contravenes due process of law.”); Fondacaro &
Stolle, supra note 3, at 363 (noting that the “Supreme Court has clearly recognized the
issuance of both professional and motor vehicle licenses as creating important property or
liberty interests requiring due process protection” (citations omitted)).
6
However, there are some federal licenses. See Federal Licenses & Permits, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/what-federal-licenses-and-permits-does
-your-business-need (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
7
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
8
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975); see also Marshall B. Kapp,
Conscripted Physician Services and the Public’s Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 414, 418
(2011) (“The states’ police power is not unlimited, but it is extremely broad.”). Usually the
power to issue a license and oversee licensee is through a state administrative agency. See,
e.g., 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.00 (2012) (“Disciplinary Proceedings for Physicians”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-391.2 (West 2012) (“Administrative suspension of license or privilege
to operate a motor vehicle”).
9
See, e.g., Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) (“[T]here is no right to
practice medicine which is not subordinate to the police power of the States.”); Locke v.
Shore, 634 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1004 (2012) (finding Florida
license requirement for interior designers constitutional); Onyiuke v. N.J. State Superior
Court, 435 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (D.N.J. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, sub nom.
Onyiuke v. New Jersey, 242 F. App’x 794 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding state rule requiring graduation from accredited law school as prerequisite to licensure rationally related to “legitimate
interest in the high standards of qualification”); Walker v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of
Superior Court of Tenn., 38 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2001) (finding regulation that required
attorney’s to disclose specialty certification in advertisements was valid); see also Bennett,
supra note 3, at 210 (“State and federal courts have consistently upheld the licensing and
regulation of professionals under the state’s police power.”); Kapp, supra note 8, at 418
(“This power has been specifically interpreted to include exclusive state authority to license
health care professionals and to set and enforce the conditions that the regulated professionals must meet in order to obtain and retain licensure.”).
10
See, e.g., Wendte v. Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers, 70 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Alaska 2003)
(“[A] licensing board need not establish that there is a nexus between a crime involving
moral turpitude and one’s ability to carry out the professional duties to issue sanctions.”);
Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 383 (“[S]ome state courts have generally concluded that
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As the complexities of an increasingly technological and mobile society have changed
the way that people interact with each other, the application of legal duties that accompany certain of those interactions has also evolved. Modern American society
is progressively more mobile, and thus more competitive within a larger pool of the
population, with its citizens frequently commuting farther for employment11 or developing specific expertise that narrows their professional options and aspirations
for the sake of marketing specialized skills.12
Recognizing that in this modern society a significant portion of the population
holds a government-issued license of some kind,13 state governments have utilized
the incentive power of license revocation laws in order to dissuade professional
licensees from violating state laws or court orders completely unrelated to their
qualifications to hold the license.14
license revocation may serve as a ‘deterrent to illegal drug distribution and use, and as a
means of rehabilitation.’” (quoting Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d
340, 344 (Mass. 1992))).
11
“Indeed, without the ability to drive, many Americans would be forced to either relocate, switch employers, or switch careers altogether.” Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 379;
see Eric Jaffe, Why American Commute Times Are Difficult to Compare to Other Countries,
ATLANTIC CITIES figs.3 & 7 (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/commute/2011
/10/american-commute-times-so-difficult-to-measure/307/; see also R.A., How Long Are American Commutes?, ECONOMIST (Oct. 16, 2011, 6:33 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs
/freeexchange/2011/10/surveys. However, recent studies suggest the number of American
citizens with a driver’s license is decreasing. More Women Have Driver’s License than Men
in U.S., USA TODAY (Nov. 12, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation
/2012/11/12/more-women-have-drivers-licenses-than-men-in-us/1700027/ (citing a study by
the University of Michigan that showed the number of young Americans with a driver’s
license has been shrinking over the past fifteen years). This could potentially force state laws
to focus more intensely on professional licenses.
12
See generally Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise
of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST.
723 (2005) (discussing the simultaneous uptick in both the market for professional services
and state regulatory bodies of those professions in the twentieth century; includes a case
study on the medical profession).
13
See id. at 724–25 (“Between 1900 and 2000 the percentage of the labor force engaged
in technical and professional occupations increased from 4 percent to over 20 percent. . . .
By the mid-twentieth century, there were more than 1,200 state occupational licensing
statutes . . . .”); see also Bob Ewing, The Right to Earn a Living Under Attack, 58 FREEMAN
18, 18 (2008), available at http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/the-right-to-earn-a-living
-under-attack#axzz2Jr2dqdCF (stating that between 1981 and 2008 the number of occupations with state licensing requirements had increased from eighty to one thousand).
14
See, e.g., Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 387–88 (“In the context of professional
license revocation for the purpose of child support enforcement, the primary state objective
is not regulation of professions . . . . Rather the state objective is to increase support collections.”); see also id. at 362, 358–59 n.10 (citing over forty state laws on the books regarding
professional and motor vehicle license revocation for failure to pay child support). A few
additional examples of state statutes curtailing the right to hold professional licenses are
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To illustrate how this works, the following will use the example of Citizen A
seeking a license to conduct Activity X. The state’s analysis for whether Citizen A
qualifies to hold a license to perform state-regulated Activity X has expanded beyond a review of whether Citizen A meets the qualifications necessary to conduct
Activity X at a level acceptable to be a licensee in the state.15 This expansion means
that the review of Citizen A—who otherwise meets the licensing qualifications
necessary to conduct Activity X—looks to see if Citizen A cannot have a license for
other reasons, that is, actions that are unrelated to conducting licensed Activity X.16
These “unrelated actions” are usually violations of the state’s other laws. Some state
statutes now even explicitly express that violations of certain laws lead to professional license revocation.17 In operation, the license revocation laws assist the state
in controlling these unrelated but disallowed behaviors because the licensing board
can look beyond the licensee’s qualifications to conduct the licensed activity to the
licensee’s personal actions. What is noteworthy—and until recently, unprecedented—
about these professional license revocation statutes is that they widen the already
broad scope of the state’s jurisdiction under the police power to regulate licensees
by controlling their personal lives.18 However, a line must be drawn between which
“unrelated actions” are appropriate within the state’s broad police power.19 “The
established doctrine is that this liberty [guaranteed by the Due Process Clause] may
not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative
provided here: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 13 (West 2012) (denying issuance “of a
professional or occupational certificate, registration, license, or authority to any applicant . . .
in . . . default” of a loan issued by the Massachusetts Education Financing Authority); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:71C-19 (West 2012) (defining student loan default as professional misconduct qualifying the licensee for license suspension or revocation).
15
It is important to recognize that this form of government power is often an administrative method of enforcement “rather than [a] judicial” one. Fondacaro & Stolle, supra
note 3, at 362 (discussing how, in an effort to prevent overburdening the state court systems,
administrative procedures were used for license revocation proceedings for unpaid child
support after the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988); see also, e.g., 243 MASS. CODE
REGS. 1.00 (2012) (“Disciplinary Proceedings for Physicians”).
16
See generally Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285 (2010) (arguing that quality of care problems
in the American medical system can be helped by limiting the parameters of medical licensing
board authority to misconduct related to professional competence rather than personal character).
17
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
18
Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1462 (“[T]he expansion of government with its attendant influence on the individual [means] . . . the individual’s alternatives to acceptance of arbitrary government action are practically nonexistent, and the potential control over his personal
life is therefore practically absolute. This substantial influence which expanded governmental
activity gives the government over the private lives of its citizenry makes the restraints of
substantive due process necessary.”).
19
See Sawicki, supra note 16, at 320 (noting that courts are “failing to provide a fuller
analysis in substantive due process cases” to licensing boards).
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action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State to effect.”20
Historically, professional and other license revocation statutes were enacted to
address both criminal and civil wrongs. But the civil examination was restricted to
license-holder malpractice21—instances where a licensee failed to maintain her qualifications to hold the license—and revocation addressing actions outside the scope
of the licensed activity was only initiated for criminal offenses threatening public
safety.22 Interestingly, some of these criminal convictions resulting in license revocation were not so related to the immediate public safety as they were to the “moral
character” of the professional.23 Arguably, it is this logic that has led to a recent expansion of state licensing boards’ investigatory power into the purview of licensees’
civil behavior beyond malpractice. For example, most states now allow for professional license revocation if the licensee has unpaid child support payments24 or
student loans in default.25 This expansion of the state power to revoke licenses for
20

Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1443 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399–400 (1923)).
21
See Sawicki, supra note 16, at 292–93.
22
See, e.g., Pautsch v. Md. Real Estate Comm’n, 31 A.3d 489 (Md. 2011) (finding revocation of a real estate broker’s license due to a child abuse conviction neither arbitrary nor
capricious); Morris v. Commonwealth, 537 A.2d 93, 95 (Pa. 1988) (affirming suspension of
a pharmacist’s professional license for conviction under the Drug Act). Specific to the medical
industry, physicians have lost their licenses and even been jailed for violating the terms of the
controlled substances laws. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation
of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation
of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201,
220 & n.58 (1999) (citing examples of several state cases in which physicians have had their
licenses rescinded for violation of controlled substances laws); see also Fondacaro & Stolle,
supra note 3, at 383–84 (referencing controlled substance violations); Sawicki, supra note 16,
at 293 (“[M]ost states authorize discipline . . . [for] criminal acts (typically felonies or crimes
of ‘moral turpitude’).”).
23
See Sawicki, supra note 16, at 291–92; Kurt W. Melchior, Court of Appeal Chips Away
at Constitutional Rights of Professional Licensees, NOSSAMAN LLP (June 8, 2010), http://
www.nossaman.com/court-appeal-chips-away-constitutional-rights-professional?print=1
(noting the case of a California dentist who had his license revoked due to his substance
abuse problems); see also Kobrin v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 832 N.E.2d 628 (Mass.
2005) (upholding the administrative board’s decision to suspend a doctor’s license in response
to his conviction of Medicare fraud); Sedivy v. State ex rel. Stenberg, 567 N.W.2d 784 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1997) (upholding a veterinarian’s license revocation in response to conviction for
federal tax evasion); Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 387 (“Often courts will reason that
such offenses involve moral turpitude bringing them within the scope of statutes providing
for professional license revocation for acts involving moral turpitude.”). But see, e.g., Brewer
v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 155 Cal. Rptr. 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (“[N]o evidence . . .
reasonably demonstrating that the evidence of [defendant’s] immoral character [in committing
child molestation] relates to his fitness to engage in the vocation of selling automobiles.”).
24
See Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 390.
25
See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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civil actions that are not related to the licensee’s professional malpractice has led to
an uptick in substantive due process challenges of such license revocation laws.26
Recently, a state explored expanding its police power even further into its analysis of a professional licensee’s civil behavior. In the aftermath of its 2006 healthcare
law,27 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’s legislature introduced proposed amendments in 2009 and 201028—hereinafter referred to as Massachusetts’s mandatory
medical service legislation—which compelled doctors, on threat of medical license
revocation, to accept all presenting patients who were insured through certain insurance plans offered through the Commonwealth’s new public insurance exchange.29
The same legislation also commanded doctors to accept, as full payment for treating
these patients they were mandated to treat, an amount set by the statute as an allowable charge for the service.30 Although these amendments did not pass into law,31
their introduction onto the Massachusetts Senate and House floors provides a good
example of the fact that in some states, regulators are increasingly interested in going
26

See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 917, 918 (1999) (“[C]hallenges to economic regulation have been common events since at least the early 1980s, and their numbers have been steadily growing.”);
infra Part I.A.
27
See generally David A. Fahrenthold, Mass. Marks Health-Care Milestone, WASH.
POST (Apr. 13, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/12
/AR2006041202037.html.
28
S. 2170, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature
.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S2170; H. 4452, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H4452. These amendments were not passed.
See Rob Tenery, Medicine’s ‘Tipping Point’: What’s Next?, ROB TENERY MD (June 10,
2011), http://www.robtenerymd.com/blog/?p=87 (“Although the proposed legislation was
reported out of committee favorably, it died as the session expired, without passing either the
House or Senate.”). A reintroduction of the amendment in the House in 2011 also did not
pass. H. 1470, 187th Leg. (Mass. 2011), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187
/House/H1470 (follow “Bill History” tab; then “Accompanied a study order, see H4476”
hyperlink; then note “No further action taken” on 1/1/2013 under that Bill History). For an
overview from the point of view of opponents of S. 2710 and H. 4452, see Richard P. Gulla,
Massachusetts Medical Society Issues Strong Opposition to Proposed Legislation Linking
Licensure to Participation in Health Plan, MASS. MED. SOC’Y, Nov. 3, 2009 (archive copy
on file with the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal and author; note that Dr. Motta is no
longer the spokesperson).
29
This is referred to as the “Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector” which operates
by “‘connect[ing]’ individuals to insurance by offering affordable, quality insurance products”
and regulating what kinds of insurance products can be in the connector. Massachusetts
Health Care Reform Plan: An Update, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 2007), http://
www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7494-02.pdf [hereinafter Massachusetts Health Care Reform].
30
The proposed amendments noted that this reimbursement rate would not be more than
110% of the Medicare rate set by the federal government through the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. See supra note 28.
31
See supra note 28.
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beyond using license revocation power in response to licensee criminal acts or malpractice and actually utilizing them to control how professionals provide and collect
for their services.
This Note will endeavor to examine the substantive due process arguments presented by any law structured like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation, namely, mandating a professional service be at a set price and provided to a
set population as a condition of licensure qualification. A listing of all potential constitutional issues of mandated medical services are highlighted in Marshall Kapp’s
Conscripted Physician Services and the Public’s Health,32 which notes that “[t]he
use of state power to command physician labor is quite questionable in terms of physicians’ rights,”33 but here the analysis engages in an expanded and specific focus
on substantive due process issues of license regulation by the states.34 In particular,
this Note will stress a key distinction between the licensee activity targeted by the
proposed Massachusetts amendments and two other targets of past professional license revocation laws: delinquent child support and student loan payments. This
Note puts forward that there is a key distinction between these activities; the latter
two address a licensee’s violation of a preexisting legal duty, which is absent in the
activity targeted by the Massachusetts amendments.35
This distinction is the basis for the standard that this Note puts forth—that
professional license revocation laws are constitutionally defensible only where the
state must respond to the licensee’s violation of a civil legal duty to another citizen
or to protect the general public from crime; only these are non-arbitrary uses of the
state’s police power.36 Even though unrelated to the licensee’s professional activities, a legal duty has clearly been entered into where that licensee owes child support
or student loan payments.37 But a civil legal duty is not present between unconnected
parties, for example where a professional licensee has not agreed to provide services
32

See supra note 8. Kapp contemplates the effects of the new federal health care law.
Kapp’s highlighting of a version of Massachusetts’s proposed legislation discussed in this
Note as an example of this potential problem was the latter’s inspiration. See Kapp, supra
note 8.
33
Kapp, supra note 8, at 419.
34
Cf. Bennett, supra note 3, at 206–10 (discussing procedural due process); Fondacaro &
Stolle, supra note 3, at 362–88 (analyzing—in the context of motor vehicle and professional
license revocations for child support payment defaults—procedural due process, substantive
due process, and equal protection).
35
An analysis of the argument that the decision to enter the professional field is a voluntary one and thus rebuts this point is beyond the scope of this Note, but this Note does explain that the legal duty of a physician has never been held to start until the physician-patient
relationship has been entered into consensually by both doctor and patient. See infra Part II.B.
36
See supra note 20 and accompanying text; cf. infra Part II.B (highlighting why a law
structured like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation is an arbitrary use of
the state’s police power).
37
See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text (discussing the basis of legal duty for
child support and student loans).
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to a client, such as in the doctor-patient context that Massachusetts’s mandatory
medical services legislation addresses.38 Therefore, there is a case to be made as to
why substantive due process challenges to proposed legislation like Massachusetts’s
mandatory medical services legislation could prevent such a reality from coming to
fruition on a larger scale.
In discussing the merits of the above, this Note will also explore the possibility
of a higher scrutiny standard for substantive due process review of professional licenses and the policy issues surrounding medical care delivery. Part I.A of this Note
examines the historical basis for reviewing professional license revocation laws
under the deferential rational basis review. Parts I.B and I.C describe what is at stake
by providing further background on Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services
legislation, national implications in light of the Federal Affordable Care Act, and
how insurance networks affect this. Part II.A revisits whether the hypothetical fundamental right of livelihood might be appropriate to implement this in our twentyfirst-century regulatory state. Part II.B puts forth that even without a fundamental
right to livelihood, a law structured like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation would still be unconstitutional under the rational basis review
framework discussed in Part I.A. Part III notes the implications of greater due process protections under some state constitutions. Alternative approaches to fixing the
policy issues are discussed in Part IV.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Existing State Laws Revoking Professional Licenses and the Standard of
Review Used to Evaluate Them
Outside of malpractice actions, professional license revocation to combat delinquent parents owing child support was one of the first areas of civil behavior unrelated to licensee qualifications to affect a licensee’s property right. Numerous state
statutes were enacted starting in the early 1990s,39 which allowed for the revocation
of the defaulting payer’s motor vehicle and/or professional license as a penalty.40
Professional licenses were targeted mainly for the reason that some offending payers
were “non-wage earners,”41 and therefore payment could not be automatically withheld from their salaries.42
38
See infra Part II.B (explaining the current accepted scope of a physician’s duty to a
potential patient).
39
See Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 357–60, 358 n.10, 389.
40
See id. at 358. See generally, e.g., Pamela Forrestall Roper, Note, Hitting Deadbeat
Parents Where It Hurts: “Punitive” Mechanisms in Child Support Enforcement, 14 ALASKA
L. REV. 41 (1997) (discussing efforts to collect child support payments in the State of Alaska).
41
Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 358.
42
See id. (“A significant share of the amount collected is directly attributable to federally
required income withholding from noncustodial parents’ wages.”).
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A number of these statutes have recently survived substantive due process challenges in state and federal courts.43 And an analysis of the constitutionality of revocation actions for failure to pay child support reveals such laws are likely constitutional.44
Similarly, revocation statutes in relation to unpaid student loans have recently been
proposed and enacted in several states,45 found appropriately analogous to the child
support revocation laws,46 and also are predicted to pass constitutional muster.47 To
date, the rational basis review tier48 has been consistently applied to any sort of removal procedure for licenses as property rights.49 The legal test for a law being
scrutinized under this type of review is whether it is “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”50 This test is very deferential to the government’s prerogative in enacting the law, and it is rare for this review to come out on the side of
the plaintiff and against the imposition of the government’s law.51 Although the
43

See, e.g., id. at 372–73 n.104; accord Revocation of Prof. Licenses Due to Student
Loan Arrears, Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. No. 12-22, at 3 (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Op. Tenn.
Att’y Gen.] (discussing Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571 (Wash. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1282 (2007) (suspending commercial driver’s license for failure to pay
child support pursuant to state’s power under applicable license revocation statute) and
Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F. Supp. 1037 (D.S.D. 1995) (demonstrating that driver’s
license suspension is effective to encourage child support payments)).
44
See generally Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 398–99 (concluding that it will be
exceedingly difficult to find license revocation statutes for unpaid child support unconstitutional).
45
See, e.g., Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen., supra note 43, at 1; see also Drew Fritton et al.,
Student Loan Defaults and Professional Licenses, UNIV. OF VT. LEGIS. RES. SHOP (Mar. 15,
2002), available at http://www.uvm.edu/~vlrs/Education/studentloansprofessionallicenses
.pdf (discussing passage of license revocation laws for student loans defaults in Texas, New
Jersey, and Georgia); Emily Bregel, Loan Defaults Sting Tennessee Nurses, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011/jan/18/loan
-defaults-sting-nurses/?local; Consequences of Default, STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE, http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/collections/federal-loans/consequences
-of-default-federal/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
46
See, e.g., Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen., supra note 43, at 3.
47
See id.; see also Fritton et al., supra note 45, at 3–4 (finding constitutional issues with
such a statute to be similar to those presented by the license revocation statutes already in
place for child support payments).
48
“The minimal level of review is the ‘rational basis test.’ All laws challenged under the
due process clause . . . must meet at least rational basis review.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 540 (3d ed. 2006).
49
“[T]he courts have held that professional licensure does not implicate the regulated
party’s fundamental rights . . . [and so the law is] evaluated by the courts under the highly
deferential rational relationship test.” Kapp, supra note 8, at 418 (citation omitted); see also
Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 372, 381; Sawicki, supra note 16, at 296.
50
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 540.
51
Id. (explaining that “any conceivable legitimate purpose is sufficient” in order to pass
the rational basis test).
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latter situation is not impossible,52 it must be a “government[ ] action [that] is ‘clearly
wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.’”53
Given that professional (and other) licenses are issued under the state’s police
power54 and that power has been interpreted to be very broad,55 it follows that it
must be an extraordinary state use of the police power to be found unconstitutional
using the rational basis review test—one that is so “wholly irrelevant”56 that no
“minimal[ ] rational relation” can be found.57 In sum this extraordinary use of state
police power must amount to an “arbitrary power” by the state.58
B. Reaction to Massachusetts Health Care Reform and Theoretical Implications
on a National Scale
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted legislation in 2006 that mandated
state residents purchase or otherwise obtain health insurance.59 The law achieved
this by creating both financial mandates and incentives, including requirements on
employers to provide health insurance coverage for their workers or face a penalty
cost per employee, an expansion of Medicaid,60 a specialized consumer market for
affordable insurance through a convergence of individual and small-group insurance
markets via an intermediary agency, and a provision for government-funded subsidies to assist individuals in purchasing individual plans.61

52

Sawicki, supra note 16, at 295 (“[T]he substantive due process requirement that the
criteria for licensure and discipline be rationally related to the practice of medicine necessarily implies that there are at least some criteria that do not satisfy this standard.”).
53
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 685 (quoting Matthews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181,
185 (1976)); see also Ariel R. Schwartz, Note, Doubtful Duty: Physicians’ Legal Obligation
to Treat During an Epidemic, 60 STAN. L. REV. 657, 689 (2007).
54
See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
55
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
56
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 677 (“The constitutional safeguard is offended [under
rational basis review] only if a classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State’s objective.”).
57
Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 372 (citation omitted). An argument is made that
this standard is met in the case of Massachusetts’s proposed legislation regarding physician
licenses later in this Note. See infra Part II.B.
58
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
59
2006 Mass. Legis. Serv. 111 (West); see also Massachusetts Health Care Reform,
supra note 29.
60
For an overview of this program, see What Is Medicare/Medicaid?, MED. NEWS TODAY,
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/info/medicare-medicaid/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). This
is known as the “MassHealth” program in Massachusetts. See Massachusetts Health Care
Reform, supra note 29.
61
See Massachusetts Health Care Reform, supra note 29.
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As a result, thousands of previously uninsured Commonwealth residents
attained coverage for their health care expenses.62 However, the nearly half-million63
of the newly covered patients exacerbated a shortage of primary care doctors that
Massachusetts was experiencing even before the health care reform legislation of
2006.64 The Commonwealth therefore found itself in a situation where it had successfully insured previously uninsured residents, yet those residents were unable to
access the primary care physician market, due to medical practices not taking on any
more patients or limiting those they did take.65 Partially in response to this situation,
the two aforementioned amendments were proposed in both the Massachusetts
House of Representatives and Senate in 2009.66 Each contained language that compelled physicians to accept certain “affordable health plan[s]”67 as full payment for
services rendered or face revocation of their medical licenses.68 The language of the
Senate version of the proposed law reads:
Every health care provider licensed in the commonwealth which
provides covered services to a person covered under “Affordable
Health Plans” must provide such service to any such person, as
a condition of their licensure, and must accept payment at [110%
of the Medicare reimbursement rate for those services as if they
were rendered to a Medicare beneficiary], an amount equal to
62

See infra Part I.B.
See William C. Symonds, In Massachusetts, Health Care for All?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-04-03/in-massachusetts
-health-care-for-all-businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
64
See Kapp, supra note 8, at 416 & n.34; Tanya Albert Henry, Physician Shortage in
Massachusetts Continues to Squeeze Primary Care, AM. MED. NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011), http://
www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/10/10/prsc1012.htm. See generally MASS. MED. SOC’Y,
PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE STUDY (Sept. 2009) (reporting on a study of physician labor market
conditions from 2002 to 2009 that revealed chronic physician shortages in the Commonwealth) (on file with author).
65
See, e.g., MASS. MED. SOC’Y, supra note 64, at 3 (finding for Internal Medicine alone,
“[l]ess than half (44%) of internal medicine physicians are accepting new patients”).
66
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
67
This term refers to health insurance plans sold within the State Connector that are targeted towards small employers. See MASS. MED. SOC’Y, PHYSICIAN GUIDE TO COMMONWEALTH CARE/CHOICE 8 (2007), available at http://tinyurl.com/o7vsvya (“The Connector
will provide affordable health plan products to small groups/businesses and individuals. The
Connector granted its Seal of Approval to seven health plans . . . .”).
68
See Gulla, supra note 28; see also supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. Compare
also the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), which aimed to do the same
thing for physicians who did not treat patients during an epidemic. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY
HEALTH POWERS ACT § 401 (2001); see Schwartz, supra note 53, at 686. Schwartz’s due process analysis focuses on the procedural due process failings of the MSEHPA specifically but
does not consider mandates for routine care. See id. at 688–89.
63
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the actuarial equivalent [to that] rate, or the applicable contract
rate with the carrier for the carrier’s product offering with the
lowest level benefit plan available to the general public within
the Connector . . . .69
Essentially, the Massachusetts legislature attempted to solve its physician shortage
problem by mandating that doctors accept patients insured through the specialty
Affordable Health Plans cited to in the statute and provided through the governmentregulated health insurance exchange.70 What made this regulatory control attempt
distinctive from a previous, yet similar, medical license revocation law in the Commonwealth71 (and also present in other states72) was the fact that it mandated physician
participation in the insurance program.73
The potential for replication of Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services
legislation by other states in the wake of the recent federal health care reform shows
there may be implications on a national scale for the future of medical licensure
regulation.74 The physician shortage in Massachusetts is not limited to that state,75
69

S. 2170, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature
.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S2170. Identical language is also present in the accompanying House
bill. See H. 4452, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature
.gov/Bills/186/House/H4452; see also Gulla, supra note 28.
70
See Gulla, supra note 28.
71
This was in regards to balance billing. See Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790
(1st Cir. 1987) (upholding state statute prohibiting balance billing as a condition of medical
licensure). For a definition of balance billing, see infra note 79.
72
See, e.g., infra note 82.
73
In comparison, balance billing was a voluntary decision on the doctor’s part. See
Dukakis, 815 F.2d at 792–93; see also infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
74
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)); see also
Kapp, supra note 8, at 415.
75
See CTR. FOR WORKFORCE STUDIES, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., RECENT STUDIES AND
REPORTS ON PHYSICIAN SHORTAGES IN THE U.S. 1 (2009) available at http://www.aacom
.org/Documents/bodu/2009-05/Recent%20Studies%20Physician%20Workforce%20Shortages
-%20April%202009%20-%20AAMC%20Salsberg%20%282%29.pdf (“Over the past several
years, a growing number of national and state or specialty specific studies indicate that the
U.S. physician workforce is facing current or future shortages.”); Suzanne Sataline & Shirley
S. Wang, Medical Schools Can’t Keep Up, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2010), http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB10001424052702304506904575180331528424238.html (listing 954,000 as
the current number of doctors, and estimating that this country will have a general shortage
of 150,000 doctors in the next fifteen years based on medical school enrollment and spots
for mandatory residency training programs, which are restricted because teaching hospitals
rely heavily on federal funds from Medicare to pay the resident doctors); see also Kapp,
supra note 8, at 414–16. But see David C. Goodman & Elliott S. Fisher, Physician Workforce
Crisis? Wrong Diagnosis, Wrong Prescription, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1658, 1658–61 (2008),
available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0800319 (questioning whether
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and the nation as a whole is seeing declining membership of medical providers in
the Medicare and Medicaid networks generally,76 especially among family providers.
Forty-five percent of those physicians stating that they are unlikely or unwilling to
take on publicly insured patients are family practitioners.77 One reason proffered for
these declining numbers within the networks were government cuts to reimbursement rates,78 and although physicians are not barred from balance billing79 or charging their full rate over and above the insurance contribution for patients holding
most insurance plans,80 there are regulatory bars to the practice for Medicare and
Medicaid patients at both the federal81 and state82 level.
having more physicians will translate into better care for Americans); Sarah Kliff, Doctor
Shortage? What Doctor Shortage?, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/15/doctor-shortage-what-doctor-shortage/ (reporting on
a new Health Affairs study that suggests the statistics predicting a shortage of doctors for
newly insured patients seeking medical care are overblown due to changes in how medical
practices operate).
76
See Kapp, supra note 8, at 415 (“Doctors are threatening to drop out of Medicare
because cuts in Medicare reimbursement rates mean they can’t even cover their costs.”
(quoting Grace-Marie Turner, Nine Danger Signs in Obamacare, HEARTLAND (July 2010),
available at http://www.heartland.org/healthpolicy-news.org/article/27718)); Avik Roy,
‘Health Affairs’ Study: One-Third of Doctors Won’t Accept New Medicaid Patients, FORBES
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/08/07/health-affairs-study-one-third
-of-doctors-wont-accept-new-medicaid-patients/. But cf. Kliff, supra note 75.
77
Julia Brown, More Primary Care Physicians Turning Away Medicaid Patients, MANAGED
HEALTHCARE EXEC. (July 1, 2012), http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modernmedicine.com
/mhe/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=780037.
78
See Kapp, supra note 8, at 420; Brown, supra note 77; Roy, supra note 76; cf. Gulla, supra
note 28 (“Insurers are raising premiums without additional reimbursements to physicians.”).
79
“Balance billing is the practice by which a doctor bills a patient for the balance of the
doctor’s fee over and above the amount that the [insurance] program has determined to be
a ‘reasonable charge.’” Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 790 (1st Cir. 1987); see
also Med. Soc’y of State of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 777 F. Supp. 1157, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d,
976 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Balance billing ‘provides a “safety valve” for physicians who
believe that the fee schedule does not adequately reflect the quality of services they
provide.’” (citation omitted)).
80
See infra Part I.C.
81
Physicians are barred under federal law from balance billing qualified Medicare
beneficiaries. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., PROHIBITION ON BALANCE BILLING QUALIFIED MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES
(QMBS) (revised Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education
/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/SE1128.pdf; Trina Cuppett, Medicaid Billing Guidelines, AAPC (Mar. 29, 2010), http://news.aapc.com/index.php
/2010/03/medicaid-billing-guidelines/ (citing 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 and stating that “a provider is
not to bill the difference between the amount paid by the state Medicaid plan and the provider’s
customary charge to the patient, the patient’s family or a power of attorney for the patient”).
82
See, e.g., Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790 (upholding state statute prohibiting balance billing as
a condition of medical licensure); Cuomo, 777 F. Supp. 1157; Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Marconis,
755 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Pa. 1991), aff’d, 942 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1991).

2014]

PROFESSIONAL LICENSES AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

955

Family medical providers in particular cite these regulatory limits on reimbursement as problematic for operating small, private practices, and therefore are unable
to keep up with the spiraling costs of patient care and maintaining an office while
absorbing lower reimbursement rates from patients using government-funded policies with depressed rates.83 Interest groups have been “sounding the alarm” since
2007 regarding cuts to Medicare reimbursement under the Sustainable Growth Rate
(SGR) formula,84 which is a congressional tool used to determine Medicare reimbursement rates.85 The SGR has been notoriously unreliable and described as
“broken,”86 with Congress blocking last minute pay cuts of over twenty percent to
physicians for the last several years at the expiration of each tax year.87 This is an
action the medical community points to as a major reason why doctors are reluctant
to participate in the program: the uncertainty surrounding payment has the potential
to seriously affect operating costs if a large percentage of the physician’s patients
use Medicare to cover their medical bills.88 If multiple states were to successfully
pass laws like Massachusetts’s proposed mandatory medical services legislation to
83

See Scott W. Atlas, How to Save America’s Health Care Safety Net, FORBES (Aug. 20,
2012, 9:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottatlas/2012/08/20/how-to-save-americas
-health-care-safey-net (declaring fifteen percent of medical facilities will lose money by
2019); Parija Kavilanz, Doctors Going Broke, CNN (Jan. 6, 2012, 9:39 AM), http://money
.cnn.com/2012/01/05/smallbusiness/doctors_broke/index.htm; James Rickert, Do Medicare
and Medicaid Payment Rates Really Threaten Physicians with Bankruptcy?, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG (Oct. 2, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/10/02/do-medicare-and
-medicaid-payment-rates-really-threaten-physicians-with-bankruptcy.
84
See Cheryl Clark, Medical Groups Sound Alarm on SGR ‘Crisis,’ HEALTHLEADERS
MEDIA (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/PHY-257135/Medical
-Groups-Sound-Alarm-on-SGR-Crisis##.
85
See Paul N. Van de Water, The Sustainable Growth Rate Formula and Health Reform,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view
&id=3166 (“[T]he sustainable growth rate [(SGR)] formula determines how much Medicare
pays for services that physicians provide. . . . If spending in a given year exceeds the SGR
target for that year, then the amounts paid to physicians . . . are supposed to be reduced in
the following year to move total spending back towards the target path.”); see also Kapp,
supra note 8, at 415 & n.10.
86
Gulla, supra note 28.
87
See Clark, supra note 84 (discussing a planned “23% cut in physician fees Dec. 1, . . .
followed by another 6.5% cut Jan. 1” in 2010); Gulla, supra note 28 (“The current [SGR]
formula calls for a 21 percent cut in physician reimbursements as of January 1. Each year for
the last several years, Congress has used a last-minute fix to erase planned cuts in physician
payments called for by the SGR formula.”); Medicare Program Extensions and Cuts in ‘Fiscal
Cliff’ Legislation, MASS. MED. SOC’Y (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.massmed.org/Advocacy/Key
-Issues/Medicare/Medicare-Program-Extensions-and-Cuts-in--Fiscal-Cliff--Legislation
/#.UoPIPF14xnA (noting the SGR was “fix[ed]” through 2013 preventing “Medicare physician payment rates . . . scheduled to be reduced by 26.5 percent on December 31, 2012 . . .
[were avoided] through December 31, 2013”).
88
See Kavilanz, supra note 83.
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address the shortage of doctors available to their citizens, physicians and medical
groups could potentially become bankrupt.89
C. Efforts to Innovate Medical Care Delivery in the Face of Constricting
Insurance Networks
The rise of private and public “managed care organizations” (MCOs)90 within the
healthcare insurance industry inserted third parties into the contractual relationship
between patient and doctor91 and dramatically changed the process of healthcare
delivery for Americans.92 MCOs largely accomplished this by creating contractual
networks of doctors.93 The insurance company could often control the type of care
that the doctor provided by mandating compliance with evidence-based medicine
best practices94 to qualify for reimbursement, essentially removing the ability of the
89

Parija Kavilanz, Doctors Driven to Bankruptcy, CNN (Apr. 8 2013, 11:20 AM), http://
money.cnn.com/2013/04/08/smallbusiness/doctors-bankruptcy/ (“Doctors . . . blame shrinking insurance reimbursements, changing regulations, and . . . rising costs . . . for making it
harder to keep their practices afloat.”).
90
See, e.g., Managed Care, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP
-Program-Information/By-Topics/Delivery-Systems/Managed-Care/Managed-Care.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2014); see also Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of
Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 93, 98 (2006) (noting
that “pre-authorization has the greatest impact on cost containment”).
91
See Richard Dolinar & S. Luke Leininger, Pay for Performance or Compliance? A
Second Opinion on Medicare Reimbursement, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 391, 403 (2006);
Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10–14 (1999).
92
See Hunter, supra note 90, at 121 (noting a fifty-percent increase in the number of
private-insurance policyholders under an MCO from 1992 to 1998).
93
See generally, e.g., PHYSICIAN AND OTHER HEALTH CARE PROVIDER CONTRACTING
TOOLKIT, AM. MED. ASS’N & AM. ASS’N OF PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGS. (2009), available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/psa/aappo-toolkit.pdf. In exchange for a rate set
by the insurance plan (usually lower than the doctor might charge as a market rate), the
doctors theoretically received a steady supply of patients who used the insurance plan and
were bound to use the plan’s network of providers.
94
Insurance companies use “[c]linical practice guidelines” to dictate, in some cases, the
type of care patients receive from a networked doctor. Dolinar & Leininger, supra note 91,
at 403 (“[C]ompensat[ing] health care providers according to their compliance with the ‘best
practices . . . .’”); Korobkin, supra note 91, at 12–14 (reimbursing for predefined resource
use targets). One of the most consistent efforts to force networked doctors to conform with
EBM guidelines has come from Medicare. See Elise Viebeck, Study: Most Medicare Docs
Set to Face Performance Penalties, HILL (Jan. 8, 2013, 2:32 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs
/healthwatch/medicare/275987-study-most-medicare-docs-set-to-pay-performance-penalties;
see also Kapp, supra note 8, at 420 (“The terms and conditions of physician payment are set
exclusively by the government, with the program beneficiaries enjoying no control over
those or most other aspects of their coverage.”).
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medical provider to decide independently what care to provide.95 Many private insurance groups as well as Medicare and Medicaid operate like MCOs.
In response, there have been some efforts by physicians to cut out the insurance
middlemen and deal directly with patients in both (1) deciding what services to provide and when and (2) receiving payment.96 This is often referred to as “concierge
medicine.”97 The potential for concierge medicine practice-styles to draw doctors
away from the MCO insurance network structure has been such that it has drawn the
attention of Congress,98 due to a fear that it may further decrease the pool of providers
participating in the Medicaid/Medicare insurance programs.99 As previously noted,
the latter has already been dropping markedly in recent years.100 A law structured
like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation would essentially bar
physicians from exclusively using alternative service delivery methods like concierge
care.101 There is also the additional concern that insurance companies working with

95

See Cynthia A. Smith, A Legislative Solution to the Problem of Concierge Care, 30
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 145, 146–48 (2005) (discussing problems with managed care).
96
Steve Hargreaves, Cash-Only Doctors Abandon the Insurance System, CNN (June 11,
2013, 1:44 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/11/news/economy/cash-only-doctors/.
97
See Sandra J. Carnahan, Law, Medicine, and Wealth: Does Concierge Medicine Promote
Health Care Choice, or Is It a Barrier to Access?, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 121 (2006)
(“[A] . . . growing number of physicians have distanced themselves from the constraints of
cost-conscious managed care and reduced their patient loads . . . to a select number of
patients able and willing to pay for a more personalized method of health care . . . .”); Kapp,
supra note 8, at 415 & n.8; Smith, supra note 95, at 149–50 (discussing a variety of concierge care-style arrangements).
98
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-929, PHYSICIAN SERVICES:
CONCIERGE CARE CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR MEDICARE 1 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05929.pdf; Robert M. Portman & Kate Romanow,
Concierge Medicine: Legal Issues, Ethical Dilemmas, and Policy Challenges, 1 J. HEALTH &
LIFE SCI. L. 1, 9 (2008) (“Almost from their inception, concierge practices have grabbed the
attention of federal lawmakers and regulators.”).
99
See Smith, supra note 95, at 150–51; see also Kapp, supra note 8, at 415 (“Medicare
beneficiaries could effectively be pushed into a separate (and unequal) health care system
with reduced access to physician services.”); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Spread of Concierge
Medicine Prompts Medicare Worries, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/02/concierge-medicine-medicare-health-care_n_844042
.html (“[Medicare’s] financial troubles are causing doctors to reassess their participation . . . .
[T]he impact [of concierge practices] could be broader because primary care doctors are in
short supply and [PPACA] will bring in more than 30 million newly insured patients. If
concierge medicine goes beyond just a thriving niche, it could lead to a kind of insurance
caste system . . . .”).
100
See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
101
Cf. Kapp, supra note 8, at 415 (“Without major changes in health care delivery systems . . . . Congress would have to intervene to prevent the withdrawal of providers from the
Medicare market and the severe problems with beneficiary access to care that would result.”
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state-funded programs could potentially have greater authority to further depress
market payment reimbursement rates due to the loss of bargaining power for physicians and hospitals. In general, the battle over whether physicians must accept
reimbursement via insurance has yet to be fought but demonstrates an interesting
area of potential conflict between professional licensees choosing how to conduct
their business and the state regulatory authority.
The Massachusetts Legislature’s attempt to constrain a physician’s choice of
doing business with an insurance provider through threat of license revocation was
an unprecedented attempt to expand the state police power102 in regulating professional licenses. This theoretical step threatens to control substantially how physicians practice and could be replicated nationally. What made this legislation different
from past laws proposing punitive medical license revocation for malpractice103 is
that there the doctor had the option to engage in that behavior in the first place; those
other revocation actions reflected judgment based on a violation of something the
doctor had agreed to conform to in a contractual relationship.104
The choice by a physician to accept an insurance company’s reimbursement
rates and become a medical provider in that insurer’s network is a simple contractual
choice. To decide against such a contract is behavior that is not professional malpractice, nor is it related to a criminal or civil dispute to which the licensee is a
party.105 Should any law structured like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services
legislation, in any profession requiring a license, succeed in any state, such laws will
amount to a significant reduction of a licensed professional’s autonomy in deciding
how he or she practices within the profession vis-à-vis how and when the professional provides services.106

(quoting 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, APPENDIX:
STATEMENT OF ACTUARIAL OPINION 281–82 (Aug. 5, 2010))).
102
See supra Introduction.
103
See supra notes 81–83.
104
See infra note 187 and accompanying text; see also Kapp, supra note 8, at 416–17
(noting that the doctrine of informed consent applies to both the patient and the physician’s
decision to enter into a treatment relationship); AMA Op. on Code of Med. Ethics, Op. 9.12–
Patient-Physician Relationship: Respect for the Law and Human Rights (2007), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics
/opinion912.page (“Generally, both the physician and the patient are free to enter into or
decline the relationship.”).
105
Compare the typical triggers for state license revocation laws discussed in supra
Introduction.B and Part I.A.
106
For example, these include the ability to engage in concierge-care arrangements,
require payment directly from the patient without dealing with insurance company reimbursement processes, or even pick and choose when to accept new patients into the practice.
See supra Part I.C.
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II. DEVELOPING A STANDARD FOR SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE REVOCATION ACTIONS
This Part will begin with a pitch for professional licenses to be viewed as fundamental rights and then moves on to the crux of this Note, which is that the lack
of a preexisting duty in the situation premised in Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation bars laws like that from passing the low bar of substantive
due process scrutiny under rational basis review.
A. Revisiting the Argument for Strict Review of Economic Substantive
Due Process and a Fundamental Right to Livelihood
It has been firmly established that medical licenses are subject to state regulation, and some hold this decision as barring a finding that such a license could be a
fundamental right.107 Furthermore, a fundamental right to livelihood has been dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court.108 It is not currently recognized by any of the state
courts.109 However, some commentators predict economic substantive due process’s
“slow but steady comeback,”110 and for the purposes of this Note it is worth reiterating how the significant investment modern Americans made in their livelihoods,111
coupled with the change in professional licensing regulatory initiatives,112 might
accelerate such a comeback.113 Indeed, “today the federal and state governments directly or indirectly control a great proportion of the nation’s employment”114 through
such regulation.115 Furthermore, Lambert, concerning medical licenses, derives its

107

See, e.g., Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) (“[T]here is no right to
practice medicine which is not subordinate to the police power of the states.”).
108
See id.; Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 386–87, 386 n.212 (presenting the argument of Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood,
82 KY. L.J. 397, 450 (1994), for the fundamental right of livelihood, but concluding that it
is not likely to be successful).
109
See Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 386–87.
110
Phillips, supra note 26, at 919. See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO
EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW (2010) (discussing recent efforts to
revive the fundamental right to livelihood in the face of increasing trade regulations).
111
See supra notes 11–13.
112
See supra Introduction.B.
113
See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting the rapid expansion of state professional licensing schemes in the late twentieth century); see also McCormack, supra note
108, at 450 (“Licensing and regulation, . . . restrict activities that perform many of the social
functions formerly served by property. In the post-industrial state, economic productivity,
labor, and personality functions merge in many aspects of our business lives.”).
114
Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1461; see also supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
115
See supra note 14.
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holding from authority only speaking to the state’s power to regulate entry into the
profession, not the acts of the licensees themselves.116
The modern question is thus whether this massive intrusion into the regulation
of citizens via government-issued licenses needed for their careers violates due process to the extent that the “government action . . . deprive[s] the claimant of occupational liberty . . . not merely prevent[s] her from occupying a particular job.”117
Fundamental rights are “liberties . . . so important that”118 rational basis review119 is
inappropriate for reviewing a law for substantive due process violations, so strict
scrutiny review is applied.120 For such fundamental rights, “generally the government cannot infringe upon them.”121 In a past era, economic substantive due process
was recognized as triggering strict scrutiny.122 But today, such concepts of liberty have
only been extended by the U.S. Supreme Court to rights related to personal privacy
and autonomy, travel, voting, and access to the courts.123 These are considered
“essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”124
This Note postulates that given that “the protection afforded occupational freedom depends on the degree to which it has been infringed,”125 since professional licenses are integral to career and social standing,126 it should amount to a fundamental
right to livelihood because investment in such a career and license is on par with the
essential freedom to pursue happiness127 recognized in other fundamental rights. Thus

116

Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926), cites four cases for its proposition
regarding medical licenses and the state police power: Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114
(1888) (requiring certification); Collins v. Texas, 233 U.S. 288 (1911) (finding merit in an
action for practicing without a license); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917) (requiring
medical school as a prerequisite); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926) (finding merit
in an action for practicing without a license); see also Schwartz, supra note 53, at 688–89
(addressing the Lambert case); supra Introduction.B.
117
Phillips, supra note 26, at 938.
118
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 792.
119
For an overview of this tier of scrutiny, see supra Part I.A.
120
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
121
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 792.
122
Prior to World War II and the New Deal Era, the Supreme Court recognized economic
rights and liberties as protected classes of fundamental rights based on the Supreme Court
reading in the Constitution that a person possesses natural rights to own and keep property.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 608–11; Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 371;
Phillips, supra note 26, at 917–24.
123
SANDEFUR, supra note 110, at 1–2; McCormack, supra note 108, at 401–16; Phillips,
supra note 26, at 925, 936.
124
Phillips, supra note 26, at 936.
125
Id. at 938.
126
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
127
Phillips, supra note 26, at 936.
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the Supreme Court should consider reviewing a case like Lambert and more fully
explaining the parameters of the states’ police power for professional licenses.128
In their review of the fundamental right to livelihood in application to license
revocation due to unpaid child support, Mark Fondacaro and Dennis Stolle note that
creation of a fundamental right is difficult and it must be applied to behaviors
historically beyond the reach of government.129 Due to such a standard they conclude an effort to create a fundamental right to livelihood would not be successful.130
But this overlooks a narrow yet existent area where economic substantive due process is applied to attack overly “general social and economic regulations.”131
Applying Fondacaro and Stolle’s standard to the health care industry, it is unlikely that any Supreme Court Justice would find that healthcare professionals are
beyond the reach of some government regulation.132 Additionally, federal funds
provide salaries for training newly minted doctors.133 However, an argument can be
made that a line might be drawn in the sand between an acceptable regulation within
the confines of historical precedent134 and one that is too general in its social and
economic ramifications. Indeed,
[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that the right to
follow a chosen profession, free from unreasonable governmental interference, is within the liberty concepts of due process of
law. These holdings rest on the severity of the consequences
that typically result when a professional’s license is suspended
or revoked.135
128

Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926). Although reviewing Lambert might seriously affect a large extent of case law, consider that state constitutions may grant varying
protections to professional licenses in the future. See infra Part IV. Indeed, it is not clear that
the Lambert proposition regarding medical licenses subject to the state police power discussed in the opinion is controlling in state courts: only fifteen states cite to it, and only
eleven of those were before the highest court. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 596.
129
See Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 379–80.
130
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
131
Phillips, supra note 26, at 926.
132
Cf. Smith, supra note 95, at 153–54.
133
See Sataline & Wang, supra note 75 (noting that spots for mandatory residency training programs for newly graduated medical doctors are restricted because teaching hospitals
rely heavily on federal funds from Medicare to pay the resident doctors); cf. Goodman &
Fisher, supra note 75; Kliff, supra note 75.
134
McCormack, supra note 108, at 399, 449–53 (arguing for the U.S. Supreme Court to
recognize a protected right of livelihood limited by “narrowly circumscribed uses”); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 792.
135
Bennett, supra note 3, at 211–12 (footnotes omitted); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (“[T]he significance of the private interest in retaining
employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a
person of the means of livelihood.”); McCormack, supra note 108, at 452 (“The interest in
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With this standard in mind, this Note puts forth that in light of the expanding and
unprecedented regulatory power of the states over professional occupations,136 the
U.S. Supreme Court should “identify elements that, at this stage in our history, will
trigger special solicitude under the Due Process Clause.”137 Some of these elements
may be the level of proficiency required to attain entry into the profession,138 the
average market expenditures139 required to attain entry into the profession, and the
social implications of entering and exiting certain professions.140 Due to such increasing economic costs on professionals, laws that constrain their autonomy in
practicing their trade may serve as a deterrent for their entry into the market in the
first place.141 In line with this theory, consider the example of how Massachusetts
is trying to combat this mentality among medical students, by attracting them into
the less lucrative medical specialty of primary care through tax-free grants for loan
repayments up to $50,000 in exchange for a promise of practicing in primary care.142
pursuing a lawful trade or occupation has been extolled by any number of writers, both on
the Supreme Court and elsewhere.”); Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1462 (“[T]he expansion
of government with its attendant influence on the individual [means] . . . alternatives to
acceptance of arbitrary government action are practically nonexistent, and the potential
control over his personal life is therefore practically absolute.”).
136
See supra Introduction.B.
137
McCormack, supra note 108, at 449; see also Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 386
(noting McCormack’s argument); supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text (discussing the
increasing numbers of people pursuing professional careers).
138
Waller v. State, 68 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Tex. App. 1934) (“To obtain a license and proficiency requires the expenditure of money and years of preparation, attended by toil and
self-denial.”); McCormack, supra note 108, at 452 (“In the post-industrial state, this [lawful
trade or occupation] interest takes on even more significance. The high-tech world emphasizes mental labor. Success in the modern economic world, whether viewed individually or
collectively, requires development of personality traits because skills will be the most marketable commodities we will have.”).
139
Also consider lost wage revenue from leaving the market and attending school and the
student loan debt crisis currently engulfing the United States. See Martha C. White, Is the
Student-Loan Debt Crisis Worse than We Thought?, TIME (Nov. 29, 2012), http://business
.time.com/2012/11/29/is-the-student-loan-debt-crisis-worse-than-we-thought/.
140
Bennett, supra note 3, at 212 (“Such right is the capital stock of its possessor from
which dividends are expected sufficient to protect him from the infirmity of old age . . . . To
cancel a professional license is to take the entire capital stock of its possessor and to leave
him in most instances the equivalent of a bankrupt. But it does much more than this; it takes
from him his professional standing and in a manner whatever good name he has, which
leaves him ‘poor indeed.’” (quoting Waller, 68 S.W.2d. at 605)); see also Schwartz, supra
note 53, at 690 (“At issue are physicians’ livelihoods, reputations . . . .”).
141
See McCormack, supra note 108, at 452; see also, e.g., MASS. MED. SOC’Y, PHYSICIAN
WORKFORCE STUDY 4–5 (Sept. 2009) (summarizing “Recruitment Issues”); supra Parts I.B–C.
142
See generally UMASS AHEC NETWORK, PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT
AND RETENTION PROGRAMS IN MASSACHUSETTS (updated Apr. 2011), available at http://www
.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/com-health/primary-care/primary-care-physician-recruitment.pdf.
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Building on this economic cost theory, it follows that it may actually be in the
public interest, for the sake of our economy as a whole, to allow the fundamental
right protection to careers requiring professional licensure, based on the requirement
of significant investment of time, resources, and licensure application.143 Harm to
consumers and third parties affected by the bad actions of licensed professionals are
the predominant reason offered for not finding a fundamental right to livelihood for
fear of offering licensees too much protection.144 Today such expanded regulation
of licensed professionals is perhaps detrimental to consumers and third parties,145 so
it may be reasoned that a heightened degree of substantive due process protection
is warranted for professional licenses.146
Of course, “[b]alanced against these concerns is the need for protection of the
public interest through prevention of inept practice of a profession that is so complicated that the marketplace cannot be expected to exert any sensible control on
competence.”147 Understandably, the scope of how insurance networks operate to
reimburse physicians148 has made it difficult for consumers to find physicians on
their own using market reputation or even understand reasonable pricing schemes,
which are arguably the two issues the Massachusetts mandatory medical service
legislation sought to address.149 However, it is debatable whether either of these
things relate to the ineptitude concerns of licensing a professional.150 Furthermore,
it seems that Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation would have
dissuaded people from joining the Massachusetts medical community,151 or caused

143

See McCormack, supra note 108, at 452; see also Phillips, supra note 26, at 943
(discussing a plaintiff who prevailed under rational basis review because “the ordinance
[was] more detrimental than beneficial to the public” (citation omitted)).
144
See McCormack, supra note 108, at 450 (“Government regulates these activities
precisely because they do affect persons other than the regulated.”); see also Law & Kim,
supra note 12, at 754 (“[S]tate licensing powers [are] used . . . as an instrument to ‘protect
the safety and welfare’ of consumers.”).
145
Such a license revocation law may actually further limit the number of physicians
available to citizens through revoking licenses for non-conformers, thereby further exacerbating the dearth of primary care providers and doctors in general. See supra Part I.B.
146
See McCormack, supra note 108, at 450; cf. supra note 18.
147
McCormack, supra note 108, at 452.
148
See supra Part I.C.
149
Cf. Law & Kim, supra note 12, at 724 (“The sale and purchase of professional services
are often subject to problems of asymmetric information.”).
150
See supra Introduction.B; infra Part II.B.
151
Loss of choice, it can be argued, creates “social problems [that] tend to drive out individual ethics, which are essential to the creation and cultivation of optimal physician-patient
relationships.” Kapp, supra note 8, at 418–19. The personal drive to take on the enormous
amount of sacrifice to attain the skill to enter the profession may be lost to the detriment of
society as a whole. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. Consider this effect in
conglomeration with the national physician shortage already present. See supra Part I.C.
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them to leave the state to practice elsewhere, which would not have served the
public interest.152 The loss of choice to the professional, and the possible harms to
the consumer seem to outweigh the proposed benefits of such legislation.
For these primary economic and social reasons, heightened due process protections should be granted to the professional license as a property right. This prevents
laws like the Massachusetts mandatory medical services legislation that could create
such social and economic ramifications without appropriately addressing the specialized elements of investing in a professional career and those professionals’ impact
on the public’s well-being at large.
B. Scope of the Physician’s Legal Duty of Care and Why a Law Structured like
Massachusetts Bills H. 4452 and S. 2170 Should Fail Rational Basis Review
Should the creation of a fundamental right to livelihood fail, we are left with
rational basis review, which historically has been the standard for substantive due process challenges of professional license revocations.153 Even without a fundamental
right, there is some weight that might still be given to the public welfare argument
discussed above, where some cases have prevailed under rational basis review due
to the law’s potential harm to the public.154 Additionally, there is a strong argument
to be made that a law structured like the Massachusetts mandatory medical services
legislation is “economic protectionism in its most glaring form, and this goal is not
legitimate . . . [because it amounts] to favoritism [by] only restrict[ing] [doctors] and
fail[ing] to restrict similarly-situated [professionals] such as [nurses, physicians assistants, pharmacists, etc.].”155 Due to such line drawing, it follows that the legislation is a “government[ ] action [that] is ‘clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power,
and not an exercise of [rational] judgment.’”156
But this Note argues that there are stronger grounds to find laws structured like
the Massachusetts mandatory medical services legislation arbitrary. That legislation
was distinct from past professional license revocation laws: no legal duty of care exists between a doctor and patient until both consent for the patient to be examined.157
Compare this to the preexisting duty of parenthood present in the case of child support

152

See infra Part IV.
See supra Part I.A.
154
See Phillips, supra note 26, at 943 (discussing a plaintiff who prevailed under rational
basis review because “the ordinance [was] more detrimental than beneficial to the public”
(citation omitted)).
155
Id. (citations omitted).
156
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 685 (citation omitted); see also supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
157
See infra notes 183–96 and accompanying text.
153
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payment defaults158 or a legal financial contract creating a preexisting duty to pay
that has actively been entered into in the case of defaulted upon student loans.159
The core purpose of the state licensing authority is to ensure the potential licensee is qualified to conduct the act regulated by the license.160 Indeed, although
it was demonstrated earlier that this qualification process can broadly examine the
personal actions of the licensee,161 and “[a] State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law,” before it grants an
applicant a license to practice,162 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that these qualification requirements “must [also] have a rational connection with the applicant’s
fitness or capacity” to engage in the licensed activity.163
This Note suggests that the distinction the preexisting legal duty lends in this
analysis is evidenced by the fact that courts have used it as the nexus between previously enacted license revocation statutes and the role of the state as a licensing
authority. For example, “it might appear to be a strained argument to suggest that
failure to pay child support is related to one’s professional capacity”;164 however, the
connection lies in the fact that one aspect of professional competency qualifying one
to hold a professional license is fulfilling legal obligations.165 Arguably, the insinuation is that delinquency in one legal relationship is evidence of one’s potential lack of
competency in others. Thus it could be that the licensee will act to the detriment of
the profession as a whole.166 This suggests that in cases involving child support and
student loan payment defaults, the court’s unspoken impetus to uphold the state laws
were because the laws helped protect legal relationships already in place, and the
social policy interests of financial security for raising children in the state and ensuring the solvency of loan providers were legitimate state concerns considering the

158

See Francis C. Amendola et al., 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 156 (2013) (“It is generally the rule that the parents of minor children have a fundamental duty to support them.”).
159
This would be by way of the promissory note the student loan defaulter originally
signed to receive the loans.
160
See Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 387–88; supra Introduction.
161
See supra Introduction.B.
162
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Sawicki,
supra note 16, at 293–94 (discussing constraints imposed on licensing boards by Schware).
163
Schware, 353 U.S. at 239 (emphasis added).
164
Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 387–88.
165
See id. (“[C]ourts have recognized that failure to pay child support may be related to
professional competency . . . [due to] a lack of appropriate character and fitness of the subject
professional.” (citation omitted)).
166
Cf., e.g., Lusskin v. State of Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., Bd. of Med., 731 So.
2d 67, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing an administrative complaint seeking suspension of a medical license for “noncompliance with the Physician’s Recovery Network’s
(‘PRN’) contract as a basis for his inability to practice with skill and safety”).
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effect on the state market should either of those areas become crises.167 Furthermore,
where a preexisting legal duty is evidenced, there is a rational relation to the legitimate concern about whether such licensees are fit to hold professional licenses when
they openly disregard other legal duties.168 It is this connection that makes such a
law reaching the professional license a “government[ ] action [that] is [not] ‘clearly
wrong, [nor] a display of arbitrary power, [but rather] an exercise of judgment.’”169
In other words, the act of revoking the license was an appropriate method of achieving
the ends to incentivize licensees, as citizens carried out their other legal relationships.
In comparison, the objective of the Massachusetts medical services legislation
was to ensure newly insured patients had access to physicians.170 Obviously this is
not an ignoble goal. But which insurance network a physician chooses to do business with,171 or which patients they decide to take on,172 is wholly beyond the scope
of their qualification to practice medicine and therefore it is entirely inappropriate
to predicate a forced doctor-patient relationship using a state licensing scheme.
Unless the doctor and patient have already entered into a treatment relationship there
is no preexisting legal duty that the doctor owes to the patient.173 The lack of a preexisting legal duty to be violated does not bring into question a physician’s competency of character the way that delinquent child support and student loan payments
do. This is why a law like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation
is nothing more than “a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”174
167
Namely, for the other license revocation examples discussed, by increasing demands
on the public welfare system, see Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 360, or on loan providers who, faced with increasing defaults, might decline to offer future student loans making
it impossible for some citizens to attain a professional degree.
168
Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 677 (noting rational basis review is only offended if
the law is based on “grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective”).
169
Id. at 685 (citation omitted); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
170
See Massachusetts Health Care Reform, supra note 29.
171
See supra Part I.C.
172
See Kapp, supra note 8, at 414 & nn.3–4; see also Megan Willett, Doctor Refuses to
Treat 200-Pound Woman Because of Her Weight, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 28, 2012, 11:48 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/woman-denied-medical-treatment-due-to-her-weight-2012-8
(noting doctor was completely within her rights to turn away an obese patient for fear of
injury to staff and equipment).
173
See infra notes 183–96. Arguably, the Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act,
which requires presenting patients be cared for by hospital emergency rooms even with no
payment received was a previous attempt to force a doctor-patient relationship, which drove
up rates of care for everyone. EMTALA, AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www
.acep.org/content.aspx?id=25936 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014); see also Emergency Medical
Treatment & Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (2012). However, there are two
important distinctions: the first being that the Massachusetts mandatory medical services legislation addressed non-emergency doctor-patient interactions. See Kapp, supra note 8, at 419.
Secondly, the EMTALA does not require hospitals to have an emergency room and some
hospitals are closing their emergency departments. EMTALA, supra.
174
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 685 (citation omitted).
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A great illustration of this concept is the idea that the incentive power of a
license revocation law is no more than “a system similar to civil contempt in which
the obligor holds the key to the jailhouse door.”175 In other words, the decision to
violate a legal duty lies with the licensee entirely. This does not exist between a physician and a member of the public with whom they have not entered into a doctorpatient relationship. Furthermore, because there is no legal duty present that can be
enforced, there is no reason for the physician (or any other theoretical professional
without a legal duty to act) to continue to be a physician.176 For child support or student loan default the licensee does not have the choice of avoiding his payment obligations.177 License revocation is designed to incentivize them to comply with those
obligations, whereas the physician can opt to pursue a different career that does not
require medical licensure or practice in another state where such a condition of medical licensure does not exist in response to a law like the Massachusetts mandatory
medical services legislation.178
To avoid falling into that category of arbitrary use of power, a state or federal
law generally mandating a physician’s legal duty to the public would need to be
passed. Outside of that extreme option, a connection to the medical licensing scheme
that is akin to the default of legal duties of child support and student loans could lie
in industry ethical custom, perhaps with the American Medical Association’s (AMA)
Code of Ethics,179 which asserts certain professional ethical standards, including a
mandate against “invidious discrimination” that could arguably be applied to accepting certain insurances.180 If the licensing agency in a state finds that membership
with the AMA is connected to the licensee’s character and fitness qualification requirement then perhaps a nexus can be found between the license qualification and
the act of refusing to accept certain insurance networks or patients.181 However,
given the AMA’s voluntary membership of doctors,182 this seems highly unlikely.
175

Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 388 (emphasis added).
Cf. supra Part II.A (discussing the economics and social policy implications of not
recognizing a fundamental right in modern livelihood).
177
It should be noted that bankruptcy proceedings do not discharge child support obligations nor federally subsidized student loans. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (2012).
178
For a more in-depth analysis of this possibility, see infra Part IV.
179
See generally AMA’S CODE OF MED. ETHICS (2001), available at http://www.ama
-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.page. For a description of the origins of the AMA Code of Ethics, see Schwartz, supra note 53, at 661–62.
180
See, e.g., AMA Op. on Code of Med. Ethics, Op. 9.12–Patient-Physician Relationship:
Respect for Law and Human Rights (2007), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub
/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion912.page (“The creation of
the patient-physician relationship is contractual in nature. . . . However physicians who offer
their services to the public may not decline to accept patients . . . [on a] basis that would
constitute invidious discrimination.”).
181
Consider that some commentators have found there has been a “pattern of the Court
looking to the AMA for guidance.” Schwartz, supra note 53, at 666.
182
See id. at 662 (“[O]nly a quarter of physicians are members of the [AMA] . . . .”).
176
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This is because in general, the scope of the legal duty of a treating physician has
never been purported to go beyond the treatment relationship that he or she freely
agrees to.183 This is reflected in medical malpractice case law at both the state and
federal level. These decisions generally hold that a physician’s legal duty is limited
to patients treated.184 This includes the Massachusetts courts.185 The crucial point
is that courts treat physician-patient interactions as contracts, and “[w]hether a
physician-patient relationship is created is a question of fact, turning upon a determination [about] whether the patient entrusted his treatment to the physician and the
physician accepted the case.”186 This is the key: a contractual foundation has defined
how medical services are provided in the doctor-patient relationship in this country
and other key provisions relating to patient rights rely on it.187 It follows that if a law
183

See Kapp, supra note 8, at 414 (“Historically, the physician-patient relationship has
been one into which each party enters voluntarily. According to the American Medical
Association, ‘A patient-physician relationship exists when a physician serves a patient’s
medical needs, generally by mutual consent between physician and patient (or surrogate).’”
(citing the AMA Op. on Code of Med. Ethics, Op. 10.015–The Physician-Patient Relationship (2011))).
184
See, e.g., Wolf v. Fauquier Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 555 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2009)
(stating that “liability for malpractice is predicated upon an initial finding [of] a consensual
agreement” (citation omitted)); Gaulden v. Green, 733 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
(stating that in order to succeed on the merits “plaintiff must come forward with evidence of
a physician-patient relationship”); Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 985
N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he duty of the physician is established simply
by the existence of a physician-patient relationship, not by questions of foreseeability.”
(citation omitted)); Jennings v. Badgett, 230 P.3d 861, 865 (Okla. 2010) (“[A] physician is
not under a general duty to provide professional services to others, [so] the physician must
consent to provide the services. The agreement of the physician to treat and the patient to
receive treatment is the basis of the employment contract.” (citation omitted)); Mead v.
Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 909 (Or. 2012) (en banc) (establishing that “physicianpatient relationship is a necessary predicate”).
185
Calhoun v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 2d 500, 508 (D. Mass. 2008) (“[Plaintiff] must
first establish the existence of a physician-patient relationship.”). This apparent conflict with
the failed legislation discussed supra in Part I.B is likely something that would have been
hotly contested in Massachusetts malpractice actions. However, it is doubtful that if the law
had succeeded a non-patient could successfully sue for professional malpractice, unless of
course the doctor illegally refused to treat them. However, if Massachusetts had needed to
declare a general duty of care to the public in order to make their mandatory medical service
legislation legal given the contractual standard mentioned above, such a requisite legal foundation might open medical doctors to malpractice actions from patients they had not actively
treated. The policy implications of this issue are beyond the scope of this Note, but are important to recognize in the context of this Note’s discussion.
186
Wolf, 555 F.3d at 320 (emphasis added) (quoting Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103,
105 (Va. 1977)).
187
For example, the doctrine of informed consent protects patients from unwanted medical treatment and gives them the right to refuse care or procedures that are even against the
advice of the doctor’s expertise. See Kapp, supra note 8, at 416–17 (citing Rachel Reibman,
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like the Massachusetts mandatory medical services legislation can be held constitutional, the implications of controlling the autonomy of one party to the physicianpatient relationship means that it may open the door for the other side to also be
controlled through receipt of mandatory medical procedures.188 A good example of
the latter is the brewing debate over mandatory vaccines.189
Connected to this debate are religious and moral objections to entering into a
contract to provide medical services.190 For example, a law drafted like the Massachusetts mandatory medical service legislation could come into conflict with federal
or state conscience and refusal clauses, which allow providers to refuse to conduct
services inapposite to their personal moral convictions.191 It could also affect a physician’s direct threat defense and right to refer if they feel they do not possess the
appropriate expertise to treat.192 These other legal doctrines are highly suggestive of
the importance of the medical provider’s personal autonomy in deciding which
physician-patient relationships they will enter into in the first place.193 Similarly,
language in the AMA suggests it “recognizes a physician can ethically refuse to
provide a treatment because he objects to the nature of the treatment, but a physician
Comment, The Patient Wanted the Doctor to Treat Her in the Closet, but the Janitor Wouldn’t
Open the Door: Healthcare Provider Rights of Refusal Versus LGB Rights to Reproductive
and Elder Healthcare, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 65, 91 (2009)). Furthermore, the
seriousness of the doctor-patient legal duty is exemplified in patient rights under the tort
doctrine of abandonment liability, should the doctor inappropriately terminate treatment for
whatever reason, including payment. See Schwartz, supra note 53, at 677–78 (noting that
“states [can] require physicians to provide care once they have begun treating a patient”); cf.
AMA Op. on Code of Med. Ethics, Op. 8.115–Termination of the Patient-Physician Relationship (1996), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical
-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion8115.page.
188
See generally Marshall B. Kapp, If We Can Force People to Purchase Health Insurance,
Then Let’s Force Them to Be Treated Too, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 397, 398 (2012) (addressing
“the possibility of government-mandated medical treatment as a logical sequel” to the expanded governmental role in health care delivery following the U.S. Supreme Court’s upholding of PPACA).
189
See generally Kyra R. Wagoner, Note, Mandating the Gardasil Vaccine: A Constitutional Analysis, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 403 (2008) (examining mandatory state vaccination
programs for children); Jed Lipinski, Endangering the Herd, SLATE MAG. (Aug. 13, 2013,
10:58 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/anti
_vaxxers_why_parents_who_don_t_vaccinate_their_kids_should_be_sued_or.html (explaining the case for suing parents who refuse to vaccinate their children against formerly eradicated diseases, thereby endangering other children when the former catch the disease).
190
See Reibman, supra note 187, at 66.
191
Id. at 66–67, 66 nn.3–4, 71 n.27.
192
See Schwartz, supra note 53, at 671–74.
193
However, it should also be noted that these laws are somewhat tempered by laws
governing civil rights, which doctors are not permitted to violate in deciding whether or not
to treat a patient. See id. at 668 (discussing the ADA); Kapp, supra note 8, at 417. However,
exclusions exist, most notably for sexual orientation. See Reibman, supra note 187, at 67.
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cannot ethically refuse to treat a specific patient because he objects to a characteristic of the patient.”194 Whether a decision not to accept a particular insurance network
can be considered actively objecting to a “characteristic of the patient,”195 such an
analysis would likely fail if the doctor could argue they were willing to treat the patient and in denying the patient’s insurance only sought to set their own price for the
services. The AMA also discusses the restraint on this in defining a “reasonable fee.”196
In summary, it follows that the argument for upholding a law like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation, which predicates mandatory service
for a set payment on threat of license revocation, is much weaker under rational basis
review than other license revocation laws. In those other instances, the professional has
previously committed some act that violates an already-existing legal duty; this is not
the case with physicians who have not yet entered into a physician-patient relationship.
III. A FURTHER COMPLICATION: STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THEORETICAL
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONWIDE MEDICAL CARE DELIVERY
An interesting variable in the debate is the effect of state constitutions granting
varying levels of due process protections. In some state courts a fundamental right
does not need to be triggered in order for a state law to be reviewed under strict
scrutiny.197 This is because some states interpret their constitution’s contract clauses
stricter than that of the Federal Constitution.198 This enables the state to find that

194

Reibman, supra note 187, at 91.
Id.
196
AMA Op. on Code of Med. Ethics, Op. 6.05–Fees for Medical Services (1994), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical
-ethics/opinion605.page (“A physician should not charge or collect an illegal or excessive
fee. . . . A fee is excessive when after a review of the facts a person knowledgeable as to
current charges made by physicians would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the
fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.”). This opinion goes on to list certain factors that can be
indicative of calculating a reasonable fee. Id. However, without numerical data, this is surely
a broad standard that could be manipulated to support either side of this debate.
197
Generally, a state court may interpret its state constitution as providing
its citizens with more, but not less, constitutional protection than the
United States Constitution. For example, a state court may strike down a
state statute for a violation of state equal protection doctrine even though
the state’s interpretation of its own equal protection clause is more expansive than the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal equal
protection clause. In such a case, the state constitutional provision will
be regarded as an adequate and independent ground for judicial review.
Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 376 (citations omitted).
198
See id. at 377 (“State courts considering the constitutionality of such programs would
therefore have the authority to strike down the state statutes that implement the program
based on state constitutional interpretation, independent of federal constitutional concerns.”).
195
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some state laws are unconstitutional where they would otherwise be upheld under
the Federal Constitution, “[a]s long as the state has never previously held the provision of their state constitution in question to hold essentially the same meaning as
the Federal Constitution’s parallel provision.”199 Additionally, the state constitution
must also provide more individual protection than the Federal Constitution.200 In
these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review because it is considered a state issue.201 This presents an interesting implication for health care
delivery nationwide.202
Although exploring each state’s constitution in regard to whether the protections afforded their citizens go beyond the Federal Constitution is beyond the scope
of this Note,203 it is worth highlighting the policy implications of such a situation
should laws like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation succeed in
some states. Should these arguments become more prevalent,204 as the state regulatory structure imposes more restrictions on licensees—including any laws structured
like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation—the discussion on the
varying scope of state constitutional protection of substantive due process may become a hot topic for health care delivery.
If some courts find that states have the authority to revoke licenses through
statutory mandate, as proposed in Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation, the potential negative policy implications for our federalist system would
be legion. Where state constitutions offer more protections for the property rights
of the license-holder, there exists the possibility that statutorily authorized license
revocation laws will be struck down as unconstitutional in some states and not
others. This could lead to a patchwork of state regulatory systems where, in some

199

Id.
Id. at 376–77; see also Schwartz, supra note 53, at 676 (“[S]ome states have defined
‘disability’ more broadly than the [federal] ADA.”).
201
Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 377.
202
Id.
203
State constitutionalism is a tricky area to analyze and is problematic for predicting
when a state might grant their citizens more individual due process protection than a federal
court. See id. (describing state constitutional law as a “wasteland of confusing, conflicting . . .
pronouncements[,] [and] [s]eldom is it clear when a state supreme court will interpret their
state constitution in a manner that provides their citizens with more protection”).
204
Arguably, this attitude is presented most clearly through our country’s federalist stance.
For example, there has been strong resistance by states to founding or expansion of state
programs driven by federal order and funding, most recently over the expansion of Medicaid
contained in the PPACA, which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional, see Nat’l Fed.
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), and the refusal of some states to run the
state health exchanges mandated by the PPACA, see, e.g., Robert Pear, Most Governors
Refuse to Set Up Health Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/12/15/us/most-states-miss-deadline-to-set-up-health-exchanges.html.
200
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states physicians practice under a mandate to treat all patients who seek care from
them and/or at a set rate of reimbursement, and in other states physicians would
have more freedom in their choice of how many patients to accept and how to receive payment—that is running the business side of their practice. This could be exacerbated if insurance companies in the states mandating physician service through
medical license revocation achieve greater bargaining power over physicians in
those states.205 If such a situation were to occur, this would also potentially create
an uneven patchwork of quality of medical care in this country, as physicians potentially could migrate from the state markets that strictly regulate their freedom to
practice, into states that offer more freedom and flexibility to determine how to
deliver and how much to charge for the services they provide.206
In the alternative, however, Congress could make these issues moot through a
massive redistribution of power between the federal government and the states regarding the power to issue professional licenses.207 This redistribution of regulatory
power is not altogether improbable. The federal government has intervened in state
licensing regulatory schemes in the past by actually requiring “license restriction
programs” for child support delinquency,208 establishing minimum standards that
states must meet when issuing commercial drivers’ licenses,209 and standardizing
state motor vehicle license identification cards.210 Compared to these other federal
initiatives, the PPACA vastly changed the power structure of the insurance regulatory process in the United States by superseding many of the regulatory functions
that had traditionally been reserved for the states through their individual insurance
205

See supra Part I.C (discussing bargaining between physicians and insurance companies
for reimbursement rates).
206
Of course, it should be noted that this effect alone might deter states from enacting a
law like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation. But this also depends on the
amount of future federal involvement in the licensing of medical doctors. See infra notes 209–
11 and accompanying text.
207
It is likely that licenses for non-professional activities like driving would not be able
to come under federal control based on the state power protections of the Tenth Amendment.
See Wesley M. Oliver, A Round Peg in a Square Hole: Federal Forfeiture of State Professional Licenses, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179, 195 & n.95 (2001) (examining the federal government’s ability to revoke state-issued licenses due to the licensee’s criminal activity); cf.
Kapp, supra note 8, at 417 (comparing the idea of medical services to that of a public utility).
208
Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 3, at 358 & n.9.
209
49 U.S.C. § 31131 (2006); see also Commercial Driver’s License Program, FED. MOTOR
CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., U.S DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/registration
-licensing/cdl/cdl.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). But note that the same statute also gave
states the authority to create exemptions for some drivers. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:310j (2013).
210
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 3, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (issuing federal
minimum standards that states must meet in issuing drivers licenses identification cards).
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departments.211 Beyond that, the industry is a huge part of the national GDP,212 which
arguably creates policy grounds for federal government regulation.
In summary, if challenges to state laws structured like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation are upheld in some state courts and denied in others,
it could create significant variations in quality and delivery of medical care between
states, because those state issues are not within the jurisdiction of federal courts.
Perhaps allowing the federal government to supersede state regulation of some industries that have traditionally been within the powers left to the states213 is one way
of ameliorating this theoretical problem but not likely to occur under the PPACA’s
current structure. If it were to occur, it would certainly be a slow evolution.
IV. POLICY OPTIONS: HOW WE MIGHT MOVE FORWARD
Moving beyond the discussion on substantive due process for professional
licenses, we must also consider the factors that inspired bills like the Massachusetts
mandatory medical services legislation in the first place—namely the longstanding
national health care delivery crisis. There have been various suggestions about how

211

See State Health Insurance Mandates and the ACA Essential Benefits Provisions, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (updated Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues
-research/health/state-ins-mandates-and-aca-essential-benefits.aspx (“To prevent Federal dollars going to state benefit mandates, the health reform law requires states to defray the cost
of benefits required by state law in excess of essential health benefits.”). However, it should
be noted that the law heavily utilized the state regulatory structures already in place. For example, the PPACA’s mandate for an independent, external review of insurance claims denial
seeks to take advantage of the fact that these processes are already in place in forty states.
It does this by generally requiring all healthcare plans to be bound by existing state external
review processes on the condition that they meet the minimum requirements of the federal
external review process. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TECHNICAL
RELEASE 2010-01, INTERIM PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW RELATING TO
INTERNAL CLAIMS AND APPEALS AND EXTERNAL REVIEW UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1–2 (Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf
/ACATechnicalRelease2010-01.pdf. The state external review process must be preapproved.
Affordable Care Act: Working with States to Protect Consumers, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. &
OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS., http://cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources
/Files/external_appeals.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
212
E.g., Health Expenditure, Total (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org
/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (listing the expenses of the U.S.
healthcare system as 17.9% of the total national GDP between 2009 and 2013). Also note
that the Social Security Act created national health insurance programs that are federally
funded, so healthcare is already arguably something that falls under the federal government’s
jurisdiction to regulate through the Commerce Clause.
213
See supra Introduction.A (discussing the state police power under the Tenth Amendment).

974

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:941

to solve the problems with access to doctors.214 Letting market forces solve the price
issue with an influx of new doctors into the market is a valid one,215 but increasing
the number of doctors in this country is complicated given the residency requirements for practice and the way those residency programs are funded.216 Alternatively, bringing more doctors into the U.S. market is an expensive endeavor and not
necessarily a sound investment should trainees choose to leave the practice of medicine in another country or altogether.217
In his article, Marshall Kapp argues for an option placed before the consumer
rather than force the service provider to conform to “command and control forms
of regulation.”218 His primary suggestion is that the success of tax-free “health care
savings accounts,”219 which allow employees to deduct pre-tax some of their paycheck into an account exclusively used for health care expenses, could be adapted
to cover larger expenses than they currently do.220 This Note proposes this concept
could also be bolstered by the success of some dental programs that give “discounts”
based on partnerships with some insurance groups but do not otherwise provide dental benefits.221 Arguably this is the kind of market economics present in physicians
competing among concierge services discussed earlier, and so those types of medical
practices removing the insurance middleman should be encouraged rather than maligned or barred.222
214

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 95, at 158–60 (suggesting legislating a maximum workload
for primary care practitioners to combat the incentive for doctors to see as many patients a
day as possible to meet insurance network reimbursement quota requirements).
215
See Kapp, supra note 8.
216
See supra note 133.
217
E.g., Sarah Rainey, The New Brain Drain (and Who Can Blame Them?), TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 10, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/9667069/The-new-brain-drain
-and-who-can-blame-them.html (discussing the larger number of British doctors, among
other professionals, who have trained in and then left the United Kingdom to pursue better
salaries elsewhere).
218
Kapp, supra note 8, at 420.
219
See Health Savings Accounts: Is an HSA Right for You?, MAYO CLINIC, http://www
.mayoclinic.com/health/health-savings-accounts/GA00053 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
220
Kapp, supra note 8, at 420.
221
See Ashlea Ebeling, Dental Discount Plans Beat Insurance, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2009,
3:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/1116/investing-dentist-medicare-dental-discount
-plans-beat-insurance.html (“For about $100 a year you get access to a network of dentists
who have agreed to work for the sort of reduced fees they accept when they sign up for an
insurance plan’s preferred provider network.”); see also, e.g., AETNA Dental Discount Program, AETNA, http://www.aetna.com/plans-services-health-insurance/detail/dental-insurance
/dental-discount.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (describing the program as an “alternative
to dental insurance”); cf. Kapp, supra note 8, at 240 (imagining a voucher program akin to
“Food Stamp recipients [who] do not have a problem in finding food merchants who are
willing to sell them their goods”).
222
See supra Part I.C.
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However, a major problem for some small practices are burgeoning administrative costs, as previously discussed. Thus, what actually may be far more productive
is encouragement of service provider choice by encouraging new structures of medical practice delivery.223 This might be better able to solve some of the physician
shortage issues consumers face, especially for primary care services, because physicians are in a better position to understand elements of medical practice more efficiently than the average patient.224 Perhaps it is not necessarily a negative thing that
some doctors are selling their practices to hospitals or equivalent administrative entities who might be able to save more on administrative costs and better insulate
themselves from risks.225 However, this removes the element of autonomy that a
physician has over his or her practice, which should not go unacknowledged, and
working in such a situation may be hardly better than working under the Massachusetts legislation that this Note discusses. The taxing power of government has
historically been used to persuade citizens to make personal choices of their own
accord based on the incentive power of saving money.226 A tax credit scheme might
be used to encourage licensed medical practitioners to establish medical practices
that are more efficiently structured and cost less to deliver care,227 which could offset
the varying insurance reimbursement rates the practice might encounter and be
otherwise forced to pick and choose between.228 These methods of addressing the
223

See Debra A. Draper et al., High-Performance Health Plan Networks: Early Experiences,
CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE (May 2007), available at http://www.massmed
.org/advocacy/key-issues/health-care-reform/high-performance-health-plan-networks--early
-experiences-(pdf)/ (“At the market level, if these networks influence enough enrollees to shift
to high-performing providers, physicians losing market share might be motivated to improve
efficiency and quality to better compete.”); Kliff, supra note 75.
224
Consider merely the impetus of agreements between medical personnel:
From a contractual standpoint, a physician’s refusal to treat patients . . .
would be likely to jeopardize her staff privileges at a given hospital.
Without staff privileges, she might be unable to practice medicine in
that region . . . . This contractual relationship between physicians and
hospitals creates strong professional, financial, and social pressures to
ensure [treatment].
Schwartz, supra note 53, at 679.
225
See Parija Kavilanz, Doctors Bail Out on Their Practices, CNN (July 16, 2013, 9:18 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/16/smallbusiness/doctors-selling-practices/index.html. Of course,
this also means doctors would become employees or contractors of said hospitals, which could
restrict professional autonomy in other ways.
226
See, e.g., Federal Incentives for Wind Power Deployment, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://
www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/51452.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (“The federal government uses several tax-based policy incentives to stimulate the deployment of wind power.”).
227
See Goodman & Fisher, supra note 75, at 1660–61.
228
This Note presents this as an example of Kapp’s call for “other supply side policy interventions that economically empower, and hence make more desirable to physicians, individuals who otherwise would be unattractive additions to a physician’s practice roster because
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health care delivery problem are potentially constructive ways of tackling the access
problem without hamstringing the significant property rights in professional medical
licenses that are protected by due process.
CONCLUSION
Licenses are property rights historically subject to substantive due process
review. Their revocation, however, is usually upheld under rational basis review.
Laws structured like Massachusetts’s mandatory medical services legislation bring
into focus the question of whether this standard is still acceptable in the modern
world, where licensed professionals are much more common and a career is much
closer to an intangible piece of property with significant investment of resources into
that property than ever before.
Unlike the license revocation laws passed in response to defaults on childsupport or student loans payments, a preexisting legal duty is not present where
doctors have not yet entered into a contract to provide their services. Furthermore,
unless state governments—or the federal government—are willing to expand radically the scope of the fiduciary duty of doctors from a mutually voluntary physicianpatient relationship at the beginning of treatment229 to the entire general public at
large (as potential patients), a license revocation law structured like Massachusetts’s
mandatory medical service legislation cannot pass constitutional muster. Some regulation of medical care delivery is appropriate, but government regulatory efforts
cannot undermine the validity of a professional’s property interests in a license protected by due process in the civil context without the licensee’s violation of a legal
duty to another member of the public.

those individuals are victims of the negative financial incentives permeating the Medicare
and Medicaid programs.” Kapp, supra note 8, at 420.
229
AMA Op. on Code of Med. Ethics, Op. 10.05–Potential Patients (2008), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics
/opinion1005.page.

